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Introduction
Koizumi Junichirô was prime minister of Japan from April 2001 until September 2006, a
period of five years and five months. Given his ambitious reform agenda, it is appropriate to
reflect on his achievements during his period in office. This paper focuses on the agricultural
sector, including developments in both agricultural policy and agricultural politics under the
Koizumi administration. It also assesses these developments in the context of broader political
and policy trends under the Koizumi administration. The paper concludes that the agricultural
sector was only marginally influenced by Koizumi’s broad slate of reforms. A radical shift in
agricultural policy was never a primary goal of his administration. At most, agriculture was
indirectly affected by policy reforms in other areas and by Koizumi-initiated changes to the
overall policymaking process.
Agriculture in the context of Koizumi’s structural reforms
Many would argue that agriculture in Japan is ripe for reform and that Koizumi was the
‘structural reform king’ who could be expected to champion the cause of agricultural reform
“Given former Prime Minister Koizumi’s reformist zeal, agriculture might have been
expected to be high on his list of targets for so-called ‘structural reform’. However,
an investigation of the record of his administration on agricultural policy reveals only
modest achievements in terms of policy innovation for agriculture and farm trade. To
some extent Japan’s farming sector has been impacted by processes of fiscal reform and
deregulation as well as cutbacks in rural public works. Koizumi-initiated reforms to the
policymaking process have also served to reduce the power of individual ruling Liberal
Democratic Party politicians as representatives of special interests. However, the
bureaucratic, party and interest group actors within the agricultural policy community
retain their independent policymaking authority over the farm sector. Furthermore,
the vertically segmented nature of Japan’s policymaking process will continue to limit
the possibility of trade-offs between agriculture and business over issues such as Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs).”2
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in Japan. When he formed his first Cabinet in April 2001, he instructed his newly appointed
Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), Takebe Tsutomu, ‘I want structural
reform of agriculture, forestry and fisheries to be done to the full’.1 Koizumi also chaired the
Headquarters for the Promotion of Policies for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas, a cabinet
council designed to introduce innovative policies for primary industries. In that role, he
advocated a consumer-focused agricultural policy, saying, ‘we need to support enthusiastic
and talented [farming] management, and to ensure food security and public trust in food’.2
The headquarters criticised previous agricultural policies as ‘a convoy system of protecting
the weaker farmers’ and indicated its intention to adopt a ‘modulated and lively policy’ to
increase professional farmers who were competitive. 3 Despite the rhetoric in favour of
overturning long-standing agricultural policy principles, the prime minister demonstrated
neither the drive nor the leadership seriously to tackle the agricultural reform issue - nothing
like the fervour with which he pursued postal privatisation, for example. Clearly Koizumi
prioritised his structural reform agenda, and agriculture was far from the top of the list.4
Fundamentally, agriculture was not seen as central to Koizumi’s overarching objective
of achieving the revival of the Japanese economy, encapsulated in his mantra of ‘no growth
without reform’. Nor was agricultural policy placed under the Kantei (the Prime Minister’s
Official Residence) leadership. Agricultural policy did not meet the general political conditions
for successful reform under Koizumi’s administration, namely, ‘the prime minister himself…had
a strong interest in the issue and…exercised leadership over it; the public…[felt] a strong sense
of crisis or…voiced criticism over the handling of a specific issue [with resulting pressure on
the administration to act]; special-interest politicians and bureaucrats put up relatively weak
resistance.’5 Where Koizumi did take on special-interest politicians and bureaucrats to
advance his pet projects, he ended up compromising quite substantially on his original goals
and left office with many reforms incomplete.6
It was Koizumi’s standard tactic to dramatise a confrontation with the forces of
resistance (teikô seiryoku) in his own party in order to propel reform backed by public support,
but this would have been singularly inappropriate in the case of agriculture. The public did
not have a strong sense of crisis over agriculture, and nothing like the sense of crisis they had
over other issues such as bad loans at the banks, or pension reform. Nor was the Koizumi
government loudly criticised for its handling of agricultural policy issues. Indeed, one could
argue that the real crisis in Japanese agriculture — the loss of farmland under cultivation and
the stagnation in land productivity — was not sufficiently addressed by the government
because it was not a sufficiently salient public issue. Moreover, Koizumi would have
encountered fierce rather than weak resistance from special-interest politicians and bureau-
crats in the case of agricultural reform. That did not deter Koizumi in other areas, but why
buy into a really big fight on an issue on which he did not hold deep reform convictions? He3
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was a politician from an urban electorate in Kanagawa Prefecture centring on Yokosuka City
and had little knowledge of or policy experience in agricultural matters.
This is not to say that agricultural policy change under the Koizumi administration was
not pursued for the stated purpose of advancing the structural reform of agriculture. Certainly
in terms of broad policy directions, the Koizumi administration, as already noted, came up
with ideas such as changing agricultural policy to prioritise consumers and making agriculture
a viable industry. The problem was the actual results fell far short of the original policy aims.
For example, as Honma Masayoshi points out, if the government had been truly concerned
with prioritising the interests of consumers, it would have done something to reduce the gap
between domestic and external prices for agricultural products. This did not occur, however,
as the government singularly failed to advance the structural reform of agriculture — primarily
because small-scale farmers formed the major supporting class for the ruling LDP. Moreover,
in order to eliminate the domestic and external price gap for agricultural products, it was
necessary to abolish or reduce import tariffs and liberalise trade.7
Nevertheless, Koizumi’s first MAFF Minister Takebe began by launching his ‘Private
Plan’ (so called because it did not have the full endorsement of his own ministry) to shift the
focus from an agricultural policy of equal support for all farmers (ichiritsu nôsei) to one that
provided direct income support to ‘bearer’ (i.e. full-time) farmers (ninaite).8 The plan was
designed to promote the scale expansion of farming.9 However, it foundered through lack
of support from the MAFF and because of strong resistance from Japan Agriculture (JA or
Nokyo) and influential farm politicians in the LDP (nôrin zoku).
The MAFF altered its policy position only in the wake of the 2003 bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) scandal that began in late 2001. The scandal exposed the MAFF’s
administrative incompetence10 and thereafter, it became much keener to demonstrate a policy
stance more closely aligned with Koizumi’s reform posture so that it would not be labelled
a teikô seiryoku itself At the same time it tried to escape reform pressures with a number of
concrete policies under successive ministers – beginning with Takebe, and followed by
Ôshima Tadamori and Kamei Yoshiyuki.11 These concrete policies included abolishing
ministry control over rice production adjustment (handing it over to farmers and Nokyo),
making Nokyo subject to the provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law, implementing rice policy
reform that concentrated government income supplementation on ‘bearer’ rice farmers, and
allowing general corporations to lease agricultural land in special deregulation zones.12
The MAFF also promoted its own structural adjustment policy under the heading of
the ‘structural reform of agriculture’. Koizumi’s reform line merely provided a convenient
label under which the MAFF pursued this goal.13 The core policy change, which Nokyo’s
political organisation 14 described as the ‘turning point of post-war agricultural policy’, was
the switch in the primary methodology by which the government supplemented farm4
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household incomes from the agriculture budget. Commodity-specific price policies that
benefited all producers of these commodities would be replaced by direct income subsidies
for ‘bearers’ of agriculture for the purpose of ‘stabilising the management of their farming
businesses’.15 The principle of direct income payments was enshrined in the 2005 Food,
Agriculture and Rural Areas Basic Plan (New Basic Plan)16 and then implemented in the June
2006 ‘New Bearers Management Stabilisation Law’. The measures will come into effect in
April 2007. They restrict the target of government assistance to ‘approved farmers’ and
community farming organisations. The overarching goals of the policy are to encourage scale
expansion (promoting larger sized farms) and higher productivity of land utilisation-type
agriculture such as rice, wheat and barley, soybeans, sugar beet and starch potatoes.
However, because special measures might enable farm businesses of smaller size to be still
eligible for income subsidies, it is doubtful whether the policy change will deliver on its
structural adjustment goals.
While this ‘structural reform’ policy was pursued in the shadow of possible concessions
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) or in Japan’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
negotiations, which would potentially expose domestic producers to greater international
competition, there was, in reality, little pressure for sector adjustment coming from Japanese
market opening for agricultural products. Japan retained high tariffs on many farm products,
for example, a 778 per cent tariff on rice and a 325 per cent tariff on sugar,17 which have been
internationally criticised. While some market-based reforms in relation to domestic agricul-
tural product pricing occurred, high levels of border protection meant that the impact of these
changes did not translate into price reductions.18
The WTO Secretariat Report on Japan, undertaken in the context of the 7th WTO
Trade Policy Review of Japan in 2005, noted that ‘Japanese agriculture policy has remained
largely unchanged since the last trade policy review’.19 The same message was contained in
the OECD Monitoring and Evaluation Report for 2005: ‘Overall, little progress in market
orientation has occurred since 1986-88, with the level of producer support remaining very
high.’20
The view of Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), of course,
was that the changes in agricultural policy did amount to drastic policy reform. The MAFF
stated that:
‘Japan has pursued drastic policy reform in its maximum extent for the past decade…. Japan
has vigorously reformed its support policies for agricultural products. The prices of major
commodities, such as rice, wheat, soybean and milk, are now determined primarily by market
forces and farm incomes are supplemented mainly through less trade-distorting direct
payments… Further radical reform will suppress enthusiastic commercial farms rather than5
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non-commercial farms, and deteriorate food self-sufficiency and multifunctional benefits. This
must be huge loss for the Japanese and their national economy’.21
However, the MAFF rejected outright a real opportunity to introduce serious market-
based reforms into rice distribution. The Japanese government decided in 2006 to deny
requests from two major commodity exchanges (the Tokyo Grain Exchange and the Kansai
Commodities Exchange) to list rice futures.22 As Japan’s major economic weekly com-
mented: ‘With the decision, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries made it clear
that the ministry and agricultural associations consider rice transactions as quite different from
those of other commodities.’23 In explaining the decision, the MAFF ‘said that listing the grain
“may prevent agricultural cooperatives and other organizations from adjusting rice output
smoothly.”’ 24 However, this position flew directly in the face of the MAFF’s rice policy,
which:
‘aims to encourage farmers to use their own discretion to adjust rice production to balance
supply and demand by the end of fiscal 2010, based on information they obtain. The ultimate
goal of the policy is to cultivate entrepreneurship among farmers so they can act on the signal
of price information, which the ministry appears to be convinced will eventually lead to
competitive rice production.’25
The rice futures market would have served ‘as the best venue for sending such a signal
to farmers’.26
Having argued that structural reform of agriculture never really made it to Koizumi’s
‘A’ list, it is worth pointing out that it has been indirectly influenced by ‘A’ list reforms, or
what can be described as the Koizumi administration’s ‘transcendental policy priorities’,
which had implications across a range of sectors. The ‘A’ list included fiscal reform, cuts in
public works spending, deregulation, and the pursuit of bilateral Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs), inclusive of FTAs.
Agriculture in the context of fiscal reform
One area of government policy where Koizumi’s structural reforms had real bite was in fiscal
policy, partly because Koizumi was locked into a promise never to raise the consumption tax
during his administration, which meant that fiscal consolidation was really dependent on
expenditure cuts, particularly in the light of central and local government debt levels, the
impact of demographic trends on social security spending and the absence of economic
growth in the early years of his administration. On budgetary matters, of course, the Ministry
of Finance (MOF) mindset for fiscal consolidation provided a strong tailwind for Koizumi’s6
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desire to reform government spending and created a general climate of expectation that the
government would make budget cuts According to the former Minister of Internal Affairs and
Communications, Takenaka Heizô, discussions in the Cabinet Office’s Council on Fiscal and
Economic Policy (CEFP) – Koizumi’s flagship entity for structural reform – increasingly
reflected the views of the MOF.27
In fiscal 2006, spending on agriculture, forestry and fisheries in the general account
(GA) budget was cut by 4.6 per cent to ¥2.83 trillion,28 which was the sixth straight cut in
a row and the second year in which agriculture, forestry and fisheries spending came in under
¥3 trillion. This was about the same level of outlay as in the second half of the 1970s.
Nevertheless, Koizumi’s ‘trinity’ of reforms, which shifted subsidy expenditure from central
to local governments, accounted for ¥49.4 billion of the reduction to the agriculture, forestry
and fisheries budget.29
Moreover, because expenditure on agricultural and rural public works regularly
comprised around 40-45 per cent of the agriculture, forestry and fisheries budget, reductions
in public works spending also made up a large proportion of cuts to spending on agriculture,
forestry and fisheries. The Koizumi administration was very successful in reducing levels of
expenditure on public works across the board,30 but the reductions affected a number of
different economic sectors and were not confined to agriculture. In this area, Koizumi was
assisted by strong public criticism of wasteful public works expenditure.
Given the reduction in public works spending, the emphasis shifted to non-public works
expenditure in the agriculture, forestry and fisheries budget, and here, the so-called
‘agricultural policy reform promotion budget’ centring on the management income
stabilisation countermeasures became important as a rationale for increased expenditure –
from ¥399 billion in 2006 to ¥413 billion in 2007.31
At no time was agriculture singled out for budget cuts. Koizumi did not target
agricultural spending for reform any more than he targeted agriculture for reform. Unlike
the United States where the Bush administration announced plans to slash farm subsidies in
its 2006 budget in order to increase military spending and spending on domestic security, the
Koizumi administration made budget cuts across all sectors (although at somewhat different
rates) and did not penalise specific sectors such as agriculture.32 Japan’s ‘budget share’
culture, namely sharing the budget bounty or the budget pain, remained alive and well during
Koizumi’s tenure in office. Over the five years of the Koizumi administration, the share of
agriculture, forestry and fisheries in the government’s GA budget remained remarkably stable
at around 3 per cent. This was only one percentage point lower than under the preceding Mori
administration, which did not pursue fiscal reconstruction.337
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Agriculture in the context of Koizumi’s deregulation drive34
The Koizumi administration worked on deregulation under the slogan of promoting
structural reforms. Its modest achievements in this area had some flow-on effects in the
agricultural sector. The Law on Special Zones for Structural Reform of July 2002 permitted
joint stock corporations to lease and manage farmland in government-designated special
deregulation zones. However, the MAFF was not prepared to allow the structural reform
special zone initiative to act as a Trojan horse for the commercialisation of agriculture. For
some time, the ministry held the line against private companies actually being allowed to own
agricultural land. It was successful in getting the restrictions it wanted built into the new
Structural Reform Special Zone Law. Private joint stock companies would not be allowed to
own farmland.
In December 2004, under continuing pressure for deregulation of the agricultural land
system, the MAFF announced that it was prepared to approve the entry into agriculture of
ordinary joint stock companies on leased land nationwide. However, it continued to hold the
line against further relaxation of farmland regulations in spite of strong pressure from the
Koizumi administration’s Regulatory Reform and Privatisation Promotion Council.
Agriculture in the context of trade policy
Promoting Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with other Asia-Pacific countries was
on Koizumi’s ‘A’ list, but his administration did not achieve any major breakthroughs on
agricultural trade. Japanese ‘agricultural protection remained a major stumbling block for any
trade talks involving Tokyo’.35 It was the stand-out issue for Japan in both WTO and FTA
negotiations.
WTO Trade Policy
A defensive posture on agriculture continued to hold Japan back from being a more active
player at the WTO in spite of the fact that Japan is one of the biggest beneficiaries of the WTO
framework.36 At the Doha Round, farm trade liberalisation remained the sticking point, and
no breakthrough offer was forthcoming from the Japanese side. Agriculture set the limits to
Japan’s concessions in the multilateral trade negotiations, irrespective of the costs to other
sectors of a failure of trade negotiations. No matter that the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI) estimated that the economic impact of a successful Doha Round agreement
would have been $401.8 billion, and the Trade Minister admitted that the failure of the round8
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dealt a severe blow to Japan.37 Japan’s agricultural trade negotiators, no doubt, cried
crocodile tears over the breakdown in negotiations.
There was only a minor shift in Japan’s agricultural trade posture at the WTO in the
form of a marginally greater willingness to make concessions on key protected products such
as rice, dairy products, starch, peanuts and beans. At the December 2005 WTO ministerial
conference in Hong Kong, MAFF Minister Nakagawa Shôichi, representing the so-called
‘Total Food Importing Country Group’ (G10), put forward a new proposal suggesting that
the same tariff-cutting rules should be applied to these so-called ‘sensitive’ items (jûyô
hinmoku) as those on non-sensitive, or general products (ippan hinmoku). He said: ‘In
principle, the starting line for them (tariff cuts) should be the same for sensitive and non-
sensitive products.’38 Previously, Japan had called for different rules for reducing tariffs on
sensitive items and general items. Nakagawa also proposed an additional 5 per cent cut in
trade-distorting subsidies for farmers, remarking: ‘We food importers are also aware of the
need to slash domestic support, because it blocks consumption of food imports.’39
However, Japan still demanded that the actual size of tariff cuts for the sensitive items
be smaller than for non-sensitive ones. Its proposal was that the margin of cuts be on a small
scale in exchange for an expansion of minimum access, low-tariff and other special formulas.
In addition, it resisted to the last the proposed introduction of a ceiling on agricultural tariff
rates. The Chairman of the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives commented: ‘If the
measure is introduced, Japan’s agriculture will collapse’.40
Significantly, the WTO declaration coming out of the ministerial talks in Hong Kong
did not include the proposed introduction of a ceiling on agricultural tariff rates. This was
because countries such as Japan and the G10 strongly opposed it. The WTO Cabinet
Declaration stated that in the market access area of the agricultural negotiations it was
‘necessary to arrive at an agreement based on considering all aspects’, and essentially
postponed addressing the question of how to deal with sensitive items, which would have a
lesser degree of market liberalisation than general items. The MAFF adopted the opinion that
in the phrase ‘all aspects’ there were grounds to suggest that the WTO was taking into account
the situation of each country.41 At a press conference of domestic and international journalists
in Hong Kong, Minister Nakagawa stated: ‘As an importing state, we have indicated
flexibility’.42 However, he reiterated his ‘strong objection’ to establishing an upper limit on
tariffs.43
FTA Trade Policy
Koizumi saw FTAs as an instrument to help Japan’s agricultural sector become more
internationally competitive, and raised the structural reform of agriculture in this context. He9
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stated after the 2003 APEC meeting in Bangkok, ‘we cannot be an agricultural isolationist
country’ (nôgyô sakoku),44 and that agriculture could not be allowed to hold up agreements
on trade. It was only when agriculture and its political allies stood in the way of one of
Koizumi’s policy priorities that he was prepared to focus his reform efforts on the farm sector.
He sought to assert his policy control over FTA negotiations by establishing a cross-ministry
coordinating body called the FTA Kankei Shôchô Kaigi (Council of Related Ministries and
Agencies on FTAs) under the leadership of the Kantei). The council was designed to bypass
opposition from farm groups, the MAFF and the nôrin zoku, particularly after initial
negotiations on the Japan-Mexico agreement in 2003 failed because of their opposition.
Koizumi declared: ‘After this, I cannot leave it to the MAFF and the nôrin zoku’.45
However, the fruits of his efforts to assert prime ministerial leadership and to facilitate
consensus-building amongst the concerned ministries were modest. The benchmarks for
agricultural access – set in the deals signed with Mexico, the Philippines and Malaysia and in
the basic agreement with Thailand – were very conservative. Not only did they introduce the
notion that phased (i.e. incremental) liberalisation was compatible with bilateral FTAs, but
they also allowed for liberalisation to occur over a long time period and/or be subject to quota
limitations, or for particular products to be excluded from the agreement altogether. Given
that FTAs should cover substantially all trade, Japan no longer expected to exempt large
protected sectors of the economy such as agriculture from the agreement. On the other hand,
the aim of the MAFF and its political allies was to see that the conclusion of an FTA did not
lead directly to the growth of exports to Japan in areas that could be troublesome.
Perhaps, most significantly, in the clash of interests between Japan’s manufacturing
exporters and investors on the one hand, and agricultural interests on the other, the latter set
the ultimate limits to any agreement. This has meant that overall, Japan was prepared to
sacrifice considerable non-agricultural economic and trade benefits for the sake of retaining
its heavy support for domestic producers of rice and other sensitive farm products. For
example, in the agreement on a basic FTA with Thailand in September 2005, Japan failed to
get tariffs on Japanese-made vehicles removed for this reason.46
Far from overturning the status quo, Koizumi was fully behind the new strategy of
‘Japanese agricultural policy on the offensive’ (seme no nôsei),47 which was an initiative of the
MAFF and key nôrin zoku who used it to gain Koizumi’s support for domestic agriculture.
One of the central objectives of this ‘offensive’ was to increase Japanese agricultural exports,
taking advantage of the Japanese food ‘boom’ overseas, and for which Koizumi was induced
to play a flag-waving role.48 In late 2004, the prime minister cited the anecdote of Japanese
apples being sold for ¥1000 a piece in China.49 Japanese rice was also popular as a ‘brand
food’ in the countries of East Asia including China.50 Koizumi later held a meeting with apple
growers, and unveiled a ‘vision’ to increase exports of farm products to a ¥1 trillion a year10
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level. He invited pioneer farm operators to the Kantei to exchange views. Learning that one
of the attendees was running a farm underground in an office building in Ôtemachi, the central
business district in Tokyo, the prime minister visited it in February 2005, praising the unique
enterprise, saying: ‘Agriculture is a new industry. Agriculture has limitless possibilities’.51
Koizumi was reported to be pinning his hopes on agriculture as the ‘trump card’ to turn
around the construction-based rural employment structure, and to revamp his own image as
someone who had ‘turned a cold shoulder to rural areas’.52
In April 2005, the government launched a government-private sector council called the
National Council for Promoting Exports of Agricultural and Marine Products, which brought
together representatives of the MAFF, METI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), local
governments, agricultural cooperatives and food manufacturers. It aimed to double the value
of agricultural produce exports over five years. Initiatives included developing types of crops
that catered to overseas markets. At the plenary session to launch the council, the prime
minister noted ‘Japanese agricultural products, which are expensive but tasty, are fully
exportable. Agriculture is a promising industry’.53 He urged the farm sector to switch from
its defensive approach to an aggressive one.54 The July 2005 fiscal and economic policy
blueprint of his administration included increased exports of agricultural products as part of
the government’s future priorities for economic growth and fiscal reconstruction.
The government’s Food, Agriculture, and Agricultural Village Policy Promotion
Headquarters, chaired by Prime Minister Koizumi, adopted the 21st Century New
Agricultural Policy 2006 (Shinnôsei 2006) in April, an initiative that aimed to strengthen the
international competitiveness of its agricultural and marine products in order to promote
exports. The initiative set various numerical targets, including the total amount of exports of
agricultural, fisheries, and forestry products that were to be doubled to ¥600 billion by 2009.55
Agriculture in the context of policymaking change
Under Koizumi, the dual structure of LDP–bureaucracy policymaking was partially displaced
by the shift towards a much more prime minister-centred policymaking system. Policymaking
became a more top-down system with more meaningful horizontal coordination taking place
at the highest levels of government – amongst the various bodies supporting the prime
minister including the Kantei and the Cabinet Office (including the CEFP), cabinet ministers
and cabinet councils, and party executives from both the LDP and its coalition partner, the
Kômeitô. The CEFP in particular acted as the engine of reform, but perhaps most
importantly, it helped some of Koizumi’s reform initiatives to succeed ‘by facilitating the direct
exercise of prime ministerial leadership.’56 Indeed, it was dubbed the ‘tool of the Koizumi
dictatorship’.5711
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Another significant change engineered by Koizumi was the exclusion of factional
influence from the process of ministerial appointments. The major hurdle that aspirants had
to pass was an ability and willingness to align themselves with prime ministerial policy
initiatives. This meant that there was no room for non-reformers in Koizumi’s Cabinet.
Koizumi categorically told reporters on the fifth anniversary of his attainment of prime
ministerial office:
‘I’m the first Liberal Democratic Party member who became prime minister without support
from the largest faction called the Tanaka, Takeshita and now Tsushima faction. I broke down
the party’s traditional faction-based politics and faction-centred personnel appointments.’58
However, for agriculture, the system remained predominantly bottom-up. The MAFF
Minister still spoke for the interests of his ministry, although he also became more of a conduit
for top-down directives. It was important for agriculture not to be seen to be out of step with
the broad thrust of Koizumi’s policy directions. On the other hand, the institutionalised
pattern of coordination and consensus-building amongst the MAFF, leading LDP farm
politicians and agricultural groups remained the predominant mode, with final decision
making largely in the hands of the dual seifu-Jimintô (government-LDP) structure acting
autonomously. These groups were not displaced by changes to the policymaking system
under Koizumi. The MAFF continued to draft all agricultural policy proposals and legislative
bills and the LDP’s agricultural policymaking committees and subcommittees continued to
filter all agricultural policy and agricultural trade policy proposals and to act as the customary
veto point. The following table lists the most important agricultural committees, their
respective policy foci and their chairmen.
What is more, the Koizumi administration singularly failed to destroy the vertically
segmented system of government administration and thus overcome the vertical divisions
within Japan’s overall policymaking system. This remained partitioned into separate policy
communities consisting of bureaucratic, party and interest group actors negotiating policies
for particular industries and sectors. In particular, the four ministries most concerned with
EPAs (METI, MAFF, MoFA and MoF) remained fractious even when pro-active attempts
were made to overcome their differences in order to move government trade strategy
forward. The Kantei still could not set strategic policy direction for external economic
negotiations and confidently expect that the concerned ministries and their associated policy
communities would follow in its wake.
This aspect of Japanese policymaking is highly significant for the prospect of Japan’s
signing FTAs with other Asian Pacific countries, and for the eventual success of Japan’s East
Asia EPA initiative launched by former METI Minister Nikai Toshihirô.59 It means that the12
Pacific Economic Papers
Table 1 Main LDP agricultural committees/subcommittees and executive groupings
Title Policy focus Current chairman/electorate
Agriculture and Forestry Agricultural product prices; imports Yatsu Yoshio (Gumma 3)
Executives  Meeting of US beef; farm management income
stabilisation countermeasures
Comprehensive Agricultural Agricultural policy reform; agricultural Yatsu Yoshio (Gumma 3)
Policy Investigation and forestry-related budget; proposed
Committee agricultural legislation; rice policy
Agriculture and Forestry Agricultural policy reform; agricultural Nishikawa Kôya (Kita Kantô
Division and forestry-related budget; proposed bloc)
agricultural legislation; agricultural
product prices
Agricultural Basic Policy Farm management income stabilisation Matsuoka Toshikatsu
Subcommittee countermeasures; rice production (Kumamoto 3)
adjustment
Agriculture, Forestry and WTO agricultural negotiations; EPA/FTA Kamei Yoshiyuki(Kanagawa
Fishery Products Trade negotiations 16); Ôshima Tadamori
Investigation Committee Acting Chairman, (Aomori
3); Matsuoka Toshikatsu
(Kumamoto 3)
Agriculture, Forestry and WTO agricultural negotiations Ôta Toyoaki (Fukushima
Fishery Products Trade Prefecture – Upper House)
Investigation Study Team
WTO Tripartite Council WTO agricultural negotiations Kamei Yoshiyuki(Kanagawa
16)
Livestock and Dairy Counter- Livestock and dairy product prices; BSE Hanashi Yasuhiro(Ibaraki 3)
measures Subcommittee
Food Problems Study Group WTO agricultural negotiations; sugar, Kondô Motohiko (Niigata 2)
starch, shiitake, rice and fisheries issues;
management countermeasures for farmers;
livestock product pricing system
Association to Rapidly Exports from agricultural, forestry and Matsuoka Toshikatsu
Promote Exports of fishery groups (Kumamoto 3)
Agricultural Products
Vegetable, Fruit and Upland Production conditions/policies for Kondô Motohiko (Niigata 2)
Farming Countermeasures vegetable, fruit and upland farming
Subcommittee
Source: Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, various issues.
Japanese government (the prime minister and his administration) cannot enforce trade-offs
between sectors, no matter how potentially valuable the gains might be to particular economic
and industry interests in Japan. The Westminster mind that exists in Australia automatically
thinks in terms of the balance of gains and losses amongst particular sectors. It assumes that13
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agriculture is going to give and industry is going to gain, but that is not how it works in Japan.
A very difficult coordination process is required to secure an agreement amongst competing
interests, in which only small concessions, if any, can be wrung from the agricultural policy
community, which is bound together tightly by a shared vested interest in agricultural
protection and whose key players make policy (including trade policy) for agriculture. As the
record shows, the agricultural sector was not sacrificed to either the Koizumi administration’s
foreign and strategic policy goals or to its industrial/external trade policy goals in the pursuit
of EPAs. There is no precedent for this kind of deal to be extracted from the Japanese
agricultural sector, and there is no suggestion that the possible FTA with Australia will be any
different.
Significantly, the United States has refused to engage in discussions on an EPA with
Japan because of the issue of agriculture. US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer spoke
about a possible EPA, including an FTA, between Japan and the United States in an April
2006 speech in Tokyo, saying: ‘If the two countries promote economic integration, they
would be able to enjoy unimaginably high economic growth.’ 60 At the same time, however,
he indicated that:
‘the issue of Japan’s agricultural market liberalisation would stand in the way of such
negotiations between the two countries. The ambassador said that the US gives priority to
concluding a comprehensive accord, including the agricultural sector. Schieffer added: “It is
Japan that must make the judgment, for if it keeps its agricultural market closed, the US will
not be able to start negotiations”.’61
The MAFF is particularly negative about concluding an EPA with the United States.
The key hurdle for any such agreement remains what the agricultural policy community in
Japan can be persuaded, or pressured, to accept – but its acceptance will still be pivotal to the
outcome as it was with previous agreements. So while METI (backed by industry) and MoFA
might have decided which countries (or groups of countries) Japan should approach for
ETA/FTA negotiations, Prime Minister Koizumi was not in a position to deliver on such
agreements.
Where Koizumi had more impact in terms of his delivery of government policy – but
only in the final year of his administration – was in the control that the LDP executive
(including himself as party president) exercised over the party itself. One of Koizumi’s singular
achievements (stemming largely from the September 2005 election in which compliance with
his postal privatisation legislation was made the price of LDP electoral endorsement)62, was
his conversion of the LDP into a more centralised organisation and a more unified, cohesive
entity on policy. Previously – both before and after electoral reform – LDP candidates,14
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especially in rural and semi-rural areas, often paid lip service to the leader’s views and the
party’s manifesto, and competed on the basis of their own individual attributes and political
standing including the ability to bring home the ‘pork’ to their constituencies.
What Koizumi engineered in 2005 was more than just a shift from candidate-based
elections to party-based elections. Firstly, he broke up the faction (Shisuikai) that was led by
Kamei Shizuka and which, over many years, had dominated the management of agricultural
policy under the leadership of its nôrin zoku members.63 Agricultural and forestry Diet
members (nôrin giin) also split over the issue of postal privatisation.64 Secondly, he managed
a unified party leadership-based election. This was an important step on the road to a
Westminster system, because it locked the LDP’s Lower House membership into the party’s
(and his own) policy manifesto. To some extent, therefore, the 2005 election was about
political reform: it established the principle that the broad mass of the party’s parliamentary
membership had to accept the policies of the leaders in government. Koizumi attacked the
independent, local vested-interest power bases of individual LDP Diet politician members,
where those vested interests challenged the major tenets of his administration’s policy on
postal privatisation.65 In this sense Koizumi went a long way towards achieving one of his
primary political goals – destroying the ‘old’ LDP. The ‘old’ LDP had never been a unified
entity in policymaking: it had always been a loose, decentralised body, enabling individual Diet
members and groups of Diet members to lobby for policies they wanted and to block the
policies they opposed. In the latter stages of the Koizumi administration, LDP Diet members
could no longer openly stand for vested interests in defiance of government policy. If they did,
they could envisage having to pay the ultimate price – disendorsement by the LDP at the next
election and the potential loss of their seat. Significantly, in the lead-up to the House of
Councillors election in 2007, the LDP is stepping in to review the selection of candidates by
local organisations and clear the way for the party’s headquarters to lead the campaigns.
This trend of greater party control over its own Diet members has all kinds of
implications for the policymaking process, including undercutting the power of individual
backbenchers as independent policy entrepreneurs, reducing the power of the zoku
representing particular local, sectional and ‘clientelistic’ interests,66 and going a long way
towards eliminating the ‘party versus government’ phenomenon in Japanese politics. Koizumi
engineered a distinct shift towards a more Westminster-style system, where the prime minister
and the cabinet lead, and the government party follows.
The change enabled Koizumi to make much more skilful use of the LDP Policy Affairs
Research Council (PARC), which began working as a powerful driving force on policy (for
example, it drew up the package of fiscal reform measures in June 2006) and to some extent
it displaced the CEFP as the flagship of Koizumi’s reforms.15
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However, agriculture was not, and it is doubtful whether it would ever be, made a test
of party loyalty and thus electoral endorsement in the way the postal privatisation was. This
would amount to a kamikaze attack on the LDP’s own farm support base. Moreover, while
Koizumi could confidently claim: ‘I have destroyed some special support organisations,
believing the interest of the public must come first’ [indirectly referring to his defeat of
postmasters’ associations and their LDP Diet representatives in the 2005 Lower House
election],67 he refrained from tampering with vote-productive links between LDP farm
politicians and Nokyo’s political groupings. Indeed, not only was he happy publicly to support
the re-election of well-known nôrin zoku in the 2005 election, but Nokyo’s new candidate for
the 2007 Upper House election in the nationwide proportional representation (PR)
constituency, Yamada Toshio, personally received his LDP endorsement from Koizumi.68
Moreover, Koizumi did not succeed in bringing the bureaucracy under control,
although he was partly successful in bringing the LDP under control. Even Takenaka
admitted in a retrospective on his time in office:
‘It is true that since carrying out politics and policymaking are a high-level knowledge-
intensive industry, it is also necessary to benefit from the bureaucrats’ accumulated knowledge.
Only a limited number of persons can see through their plots and come up with clever ideas
equivalent to theirs. Under such a circumstance, it is very difficult to make and implement
reform plans over negative reactions from bureaucrats.’69
The new leader of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Ozawa Ichirô, criticised the
structural reforms of the Koizumi administration, saying that ‘the underlying reliance on
bureaucrats has not changed.’ 70 Despite Ozawa’s anti-bureaucratic stance, which was in
keeping with DPJ’s long-held position on the need to curb bureaucratic power, many
bureaucrats reportedly resented the way in which the CEFP implemented so many policies
over their objections during the Koizumi era, including postal privatisation, financial
rehabilitation (the clean-up of bad debt at banks), regulatory reform, and economic and fiscal
reform.71
Agriculture in the context of party politics
Over the period of the Koizumi government, including the September 2005 election hailed
by some as a watershed in Japanese politics,72 agricultural representation by LDP Diet
members remained very stable. Although Koizumi’s public works cutbacks cramped the style
of LDP pork barrellers in rural districts, he did not seriously threaten the electoral nexus
between farm voters and LDP politicians, which left the nôrin zoku with their voting bases16
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intact. Sectional interest representation of agriculture remained strong in the LDP. The
electoral flux in 2005 really only took place in densely populated metropolitan areas where
floating voters were in a majority and where LDP candidates (often young, new and clinging
to Koizumi’s coat tails) replaced DPJ sitting members, and in the PR regional blocs where
party endorsement was vital.
The biggest change resulting from this election was the shift in the balance of interest
representation within the LDP more towards urban areas because of the growth in LDP
support in the cities. Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether the greater weight
of urban members in the party will translate into shifts in the party position on agriculture.
It may only be a very transient phenomenon, given that it was based on floating votes, which
may simply float away again at the next election.
Ozawa has a saying that true structural reform in Japan will come only when the DPJ
wrests power from the LDP (even if he is ex-LDP himself), reiterating one of the mantras
of his predecessor, Okada Katsuya. However, it is difficult to see how real structural reform
of agriculture would occur under an Ozawa-led government, given his party’s farm policies.
For example, in response to the LDP-government policy of targeting only agricultural
‘bearers’ for direct income subsidies, the DPJ proposed a much broader net for subsidy
payments, which would effectively prop up as many inefficient farmers as under the old
system.73 What this means is that the LDP and the Opposition parties have assumed their
traditional positions on agricultural policy, with the LDP representing the party of ‘reform’
and the Opposition parties representing support for the status quo, or the true defenders of
small-scale, inefficient farmers. The DPJ advocates a form of agrarian socialism that makes
the LDP look like a group of rabid free marketeers. Its policy on direct payments to farmers
was condemned by one farmer in Niigata Prefecture for ‘just throwing money at the
farmers’.74
It is possible that the DPJ will gain support from farmers with its policies. There are
new DPJ members in the Diet who represent agricultural interests and who have strong links
to agricultural organisations of the more ‘progressive’ type i.e. the farmers’ movement and
farmers’ leagues in Hokkaido (e.g. Sasaki Takahirô, who won the seat of Hokkaido 6, beating
the LDP member who was not a farm politician). Six out of the eight agricultural
representatives from Hokkaido, which represents a DPJ stronghold (as does Iwate because
of Ozawa), are from the DPJ, except for Koizumi’s MAFF Minister Nakagawa, and former
MAFF Minister Takebe. The single-member districts in regional areas in 2005 actually
offered very stable support for DPJ as well as LDP.17
No. 360, 2006
Agriculture and the power transition in Japanese politics
It is an open question whether Koizumi’s successor, Abe Shinzô, will make ‘reform’ the
catchcry of his administration. In the latter months of the Koizumi administration, not only
did the focus of governmental policy shift to external rather than internal issues, but some of
the economic imperatives that gave rise to Koizumi’s reform push in the first place also
moderated. Abe does not possess the kind messianic fervour about economic reform issues
(such as postal privatisation) that Koizumi did, and which generated impetus for Koizumi’s
entire reform agenda. Despite having a Takenaka equivalent in Ôta Hiroko as Minister in
Charge of Economic and Fiscal Policy, Abe will, no doubt, seek to shape his own distinct
policy identity. His book ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’, penned as a kind of election
manifesto for the LDP presidency, is almost entirely consumed with foreign and defence
policy-related issues, including the need to revise Japan’s constitution. Only education scores
his attention as a purely domestic matter although this is connected to his nationalistic impulse
and desire to engender greater patriotism in Japanese youth. Just a few pages of the book are
devoted to economic policy.75 For Abe, structural reform means revising the constitution and
the education system.76
Although Abe has indicated that he supports ‘open market principles in terms of
external trade and FTAs with countries in Asia’77 including Australia, and continued
government spending cuts,78 reactionary forces remain in the wings especially amongst the
LDP ‘Old Guard’. It is possible that if the change in the LDP leadership permits anti-
reformists back in who object to cuts in fiscal outlays and particularly sharp cuts in public
works, ‘reform momentum may peter out’.79 This is especially true as the LDP goes into pre-
election mode for the next Upper House election and for unified local elections both of which
are due in 2007. There are still LDP Diet politicians who demand funds for localities and who
have distanced themselves from Koizumi’s reform drive. Reports suggest that some members
of the LDP in the Upper House ‘are already showing resistance to further reductions in tax
allocations to local governments and to the proposed annual 3% reduction in public works
expenditures.’80 They want to repair damaged relations with support organisations.81
Government ministries are also intent on a rollback of cuts, taking advantage of the
changeover of prime minister.82 Regarding public works, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure
and Transport (MLIT) has demanded an increase of 18.3 per cent, while the MAFF has called
for a 17.9 per cent boost.83 Abe himself has expressed support for old-style public works
projects. Every time he gave a speech in the lead-up to the LDP presidential election in
September 2006, he reportedly emphasised the importance of public works projects.8418
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The fact that Abe subsequently appointed a typical nôrin zoku and pork-barrel politician
– Matsuoka Toshikatsu85 – to the post of Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in
his first Cabinet suggests that in the agricultural sector at least, it will be ‘business as usual’.
Matsuoka has expressed his support for increased imports of Australian agricultural products
into Japan as part of a proposed FTA, but only commodities to which Japanese agricultural
processors can add value and then re-export to Asia-Pacific countries. In an interview with
the press shortly after his appointment, Matsuoka reiterated his trademark themes of
aggressively promoting Japanese agricultural exports and expanding biomass energy-based
production.86 On trade matters, he blamed the United States for the failure of the WTO Doha
Round whilst declaring that he was prepared, in future talks, to adopt a stance of ‘taking
whatever we can and accepting whatever we should’.87 Likewise, he committed himself to
pursuing FTA talks in a positive manner,88 although his newfound enthusiasm for trade
liberalisation was generally attributed to his need to align his position with that of the prime
minister in order to secure the position of minister. Matsuoka rounded off his comments with
a declaration of support for core farmers, and a desire to boost agricultural productivity with
a focus on these farmers, which reflects the current MAFF policy approach.89
On the other hand, the process of reforming Japanese policymaking into a more top-
down system will continue apace under Abe. He has already indicated that he intends to
strengthen the Kantei as an instrument of the prime minister’s executive power. He also
envisages further politicising appointments to top levels of the bureaucracy, including putting
ministries under the strong political leadership of ministers, deputy ministers and state
secretaries, and making the PARC (particularly its chairman) an agent of the administration
rather than the party. All these moves are suggestive of a concerted attempt to contain the
independent policymaking authority of the bureaucracy and the PARC’s policy committees.
Abe has also proposed allowing deputy ministers to assume the chairmanships of these
committees, thus ‘avoiding a struggle between the Kantei and the LDP over policymaking’.90
Abe will also be able to take advantage of the precedent set by Koizumi in appointing cabinet
ministers who share his policies.
Conclusion
As an economic reformer, Koizumi was happy with getting postal reform through, declaring
victory and walking away. He was never particularly interested in the details of any economic
policy except postal reform. Nevertheless, the political process by which he achieved postal
reform ensured that any future LDP prime minister would have more influence in the party
and over its Diet members than previous prime ministers did before he came into office. If
a future prime minister is interested in real economic reform, he will probably be able to get19
No. 360, 2006
more done than Koizumi did because the LDP will have moved a few steps towards becoming
a more centralised party.
There is no indication, however, that agriculture is going to feature any more
prominently in the future than it has in the past. The most difficult reforms are those, of
course, that face entrenched political and bureaucratic interests, and agriculture falls squarely
into this category. It is conceivable that some movement might take place on agriculture in
the context of negotiations for FTAs with countries such as Australia where agriculture is
unavoidably central and where Koizumi’s successor has indicated a special priority interest.
However, the key players in the agricultural policy community, particularly the MAFF and
nôrin zoku, will continue to define the scope and limits to such an agreement.
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